The controversy over toll gate revenues centers on the Wellington–Masiaka highway project, which was built under a 27-year Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) agreement with the China Railway Seventh Group (CRSG), and the project
became operational on the 5th June, 2017.
Since then, the toll gates at Hastings, Songo, and Masiaka have been in use, with tariffs periodically reviewed most recently adjusted on 15th May 2024 following parliamentary approval.
However the Institute for Governance Reform (IGR), an independent public policy think tank working to strengthen governance and development through evidence-based research and citizen engagement has revealed in its just-released report on the Toll Gate that the country has lost $172 Million since the project became operational and only one million dollars had been paid officially under the leadership of the APC and SLPP governments.
But what remains a mystery is the alleged $172 million that the reports alleged to have been collected, but it is unclear to whom the amount was transferred, and the public is demanding an explanation from both APC and SLPP to give a proper account of the $172 million and to provide details of the contract agreement as report indicate that only USD1m has been paid to the GoSL’s National Revenue Authority over the same time period.
The 65-kilometer, four-lane highway connecting Freetown to the provinces was constructed for $148 million under the BOOT model, meaning CRSG finances, builds, and operates the road, then transfers ownership to the government after the concession period.
But what remains a serious concern to citizens is the issue of transparency, as the contract terms remain largely undisclosed, fueling demands from civil society and citizens for clarity on why the government’s share is so small compared to the operator’s earnings.
The lack of accountability is at play as both the APC (which initiated the project) and the SLPP (which continued it) are being pressed to explain the contract terms and revenue-sharing arrangement.
The Institute for Governance Reform (IGR) report highlights this as a case of opaque dealings undermining national development, suggesting that secrecy around the contract benefits the operator far more than the state.
Public frustration over the project is that they see the toll gate as a daily burden, yet the state gains almost nothing from the fees, raising questions about corruption, mismanagement, or poor negotiation.
The issue is now a major governance debate in Sierra Leone, with calls for both governments to disclose the full contract and renegotiate terms to ensure fair benefits for the country.
The Sierra Leone Roads Authority (SLRA) has acknowledged that it has not conducted any vehicle counts since the toll road was constructed. IGR notes that successive Ministers of Works have adopted the same posture in dealing with CRSG that is, hide all information on toll operations from the public and establish/increase toll fees without any convincing explanation.
The report indicated that at a discounted payback period of approximately 10.8 years, the toll road recovers its full investment well before the end of the 27-year BOOT concession.
This leaves an estimated 16 years during which revenues accrue entirely to the private operator, despite the absence of unrecovered capital risk.